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CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND SEX CRIMES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Robert F. Thompson II*
I. INTRODUCTION
As part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to add Federal Rules 413,
414, and 415.' In cases in which a defendant is charged with a sex crime such
as rape or child molestation, these new rules allow federal prosecutors to
introduce evidence of the defendant's bad character in order to prove that the
defendant committed the sex crime. The new rules are unusual in that they
permit a prosecutor to prove the government's case through the use of
propensity evidence, or evidence of prior misconduct on the part of the
defendant.
A quick rundown on the new rules:
- Federal Rule 413. Under Rule 413(a), in a case in which a criminal
defendant is accused of a sexual assault crime, "evidence of the defendant's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."2 In
other words, in a case in which a defendant is charged with raping a victim, the
prosecutor can introduce evidence that the defendant has previously raped
someone, in order to prove that the defendant raped the victim in the instant
case. Note that it does not matter whether the defendant was convicted or even
formally charged with the first sex crime.
• Federal Rule 414. Under Rule 414(a), if a defendant is accused of child
molestation, "evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."3 This rule allows prosecutors
accusing a defendant of child molestation to prove the defendant's criminal
liability by introducing evidence that the defendant molested children in the
past. Again, actual conviction for this past misconduct is not necessary.
* B.A., Hendrix College (1993); J.D., University of Arkansas School of Law (1997).
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1. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (1994).
2. See FED. R. EviD. 413 (emphasis added).
3. See FED. R. EviD. 414.
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- Federal Rule 415. Under Rule 415(a), if a plaintiff in a civil action sues a
defendant for damages stemming from alleged commission of conduct which
would constitute an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of
the defendant's "commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault
or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in Rule
413 and Rule 414 of these rules."4 Thus, if a plaintiff sues a defendant for civil
damages stemming from a sex crime, evidence that the defendant has engaged
in activity amounting to a sex crime in the past may be used to prove the
defendant's civil liability. Once again, actual conviction of a sex crime is not
required under this rule.5
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE NEW FEDERAL RULES
Before the adoption of Rules 413 and 414, prosecutors tried to introduce
evidence of a criminal defendant's past sex crimes through Federal Rule
404(b), which allows introduction of evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or
acts" to show "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... ." Arkansas Rule
of Evidence 404(b) is the rule under which prosecutors in Arkansas currently
attempt to introduce evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts or uncharged
criminal activity.6 The scope of Arkansas Rule 404(b) is potentially very
broad, considering that the government theoretically has to prove "intent,"
"knowledge," or another culpable mental state in most criminal prosecutions.
Many courts have in fact liberally used Rule 404(b) to introduce evidence of
a defendant's prior uncharged criminal activity.7 But Rule 404(b) has its limits,
and some federal courts, including the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, have
limited the use to which the government can introduce character evidence
under the guise of proving "intent" or "motive." 8 Rules 413 and 414 will
therefore broaden the amount of character evidence that the federal government
can introduce in sex-crime cases, both in theory and in fact.
The principal sponsors of the bill implementing these new rules were
Senator Bob Dole of Kansas and Representative Susan Molinari of New York.
In their statements to the Congress on August 21 and September 20, 1994,
Senator Dole and Representative Molinari offered two principal justifications
4. SeeFED. R. EviD. 415.
5. Because of a lack of case law interpreting Federal Rule 415 as of the publication of
this article, I will confine my discussion to Rules 413 and 414, the two new federal rules which
are applicable to criminal cases.
6. See ARK. R. EvID. 404(b).
7. See Mark A. Shef, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 57, 61-64 (1995).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1997); United States
v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274, 277-78 (8th Cir. 1996).
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for these changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 9 First, they argued that in
child molestation cases, often the only evidence is the testimony of the child-
victim, whose credibility can be easily questioned without corroboration. Dole
and Molinari stated that "there is a compelling public interest in admitting all
significant evidence that will illumine the credibility of the charge and any
denial by the defense."'0 Second, they noted that in rape cases, the defense is
often one of consent by the victim: "Alleged consent by the victim is rarely an
issue in prosecutions for other violent crimes-the accused mugger does not
claim that the victim freely handed over his wallet as a gift--but the defendant
in a rape case often contends that the victim engaged in consensual sex and
then falsely accused him." Knowledge by the jury that the defendant had
committed rapes in the past would be useful in assessing the plausibility of the
consent defense and prevent "unresolvable swearing matches" between the
victim and the defendant."
Most judges, lawyers, law professors, and legal organizations who
reviewed the proposed changes to the Federal Rules adamantly opposed them.
Opponents of the new rules feared that unfairly prejudicial evidence would
become common in criminal trials, and they believed the new rules were poorly
drafted and might create unforeseen problems. The federal Judicial Confer-
ence, made up of federal judges around the country, also opposed the new
rules. Fearful that the new rules would allow a criminal defendant to be
convicted for past (rather than charged) crimes or for being a "bad person," the
Judicial Conference suggested that the policy concerns raised by Representa-
tive Molinari and others might be better addressed by amendments to Federal
Rules 404 and 405. Despite the opposition by lawyers and federal judges, the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, and the changes it made to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, passed both houses of Congress overwhelm-
ingly and became effective on July 9, 1995.12
9. See 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Dole); 140
CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Molinari).
10. Id.
11. See 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Dole); 140
CONG. REC. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Molinari). The "consent"
justification for the new character-evidence rules seems to be the weaker of the two. In sex-
crime cases in which consent is the defense, evidence of the defendant's prior sex crimes would
presumably be. admitted under Rule 404(b), as proof of intent or absence of mistake.
12. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES, 159 F.R.D. 51, 52 (1995).
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF FEDERAL RULE 403 TO
THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
One issue presented by the adoption of the new Federal Rules is their
effect on Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Federal Rule 403 allows a federal
district judge broad discretion to exclude relevant evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. '' l Shortly after
Congress implemented the new rules admitting character evidence in sex-crime
cases, commentators began considering whether the new rules effectively
trumped Rule 403 and permitted character evidence to come into sex-crime
cases regardless of other considerations like prejudice to the defendant, or
whether Rule 403 might still keep out propensity evidence that would
otherwise come into the case under Rules 413 or 414. A strict textual analysis
of the new rules indicates that they might not be subject to Rule 403. Rule
413(a), for instance, reads simply that character evidence in sexual assault cases
"is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which
it is relevant.' ', 4 By its own terms, Rule 413 is not subject to Rule 403 or any
other federal rule of evidence.' 5
However, examination of the legislative history of the new federal rules
leads to a different conclusion. In their statements to Congress, Senator Dole
and Representative Molinari said that even with the passage of these new
evidentiary rules, "the general standards of the rules of evidence will continue
to apply, including the restrictions on hearsay evidence and the court's
authority under evidence rule 403 to exclude evidence whose probative value
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."' 6 Under Representative
Molinari and Senator Dole's view of impact of the new rules, propensity
evidence in cases involving sex crimes is presumed admissible, but district
judges would still retain some discretion under Federal Rule 403 to keep out
such evidence if it is unduly prejudicial.' 7
13. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
14. See FED. R. EvID. 413(a).
15. See Sheft, supra note 7, at 68-69. Sheft concludes that "the structure of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and the text and purpose of Rule 413, militate against Rule 403's application
in sexual assault cases prosecuted in federal court." Sheft, supra note 7, at 68-69.
16. See 140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Dole); 140
CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Molinari).
17. See 140 CONG. REc. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Dole); 140
CONG. REc. H8991-92 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Molinari). Rules 413 and
414 include one built-in protection for criminal defendants: to prevent unfair surprise, they
require federal prosecutors to disclose to the defendant any evidence that will be offered under
these rules fifteen days before trial. See FED. R. EvID. 413(b), 414(b). Rule 415 provides
similar protection for character evidence offered in civil cases. See FED. R. EviD. 415(b).
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That is the general interpretation that federal courts have given the new
federal rules. Relying on the legislative history of Rules 413 and 414, the
federal appellate courts who have considered the matter have thus far held that
Federal Rule 403's balancing test should still be applied when the district judge
determines whether to admit evidence under Rules 413 or 414. In United
States v. Larson,18 the Second Circuit considered the case of David Larson, a
criminal defendant who was convicted of transporting a thirteen-year-old boy
from Connecticut across state lines to a cabin in rural Massachusetts and
sexually molesting him. On appeal, Larson challenged a ruling by the district
judge allowing the government to introduce evidence that Larson had
victimized a twelve-year-old boy under similar circumstances sixteen to twenty
years earlier. The district court had allowed the testimony in under both Rule
404(b) and Rule 414, and had also applied a Rule 403 analysis to the evidence.
Citing statements of Senator Dole and Representative Molinari, the Second
Circuit approved the district judge's use of Rule 403 and found no abuse of
discretion in allowing the evidence in the case. 9
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has also applied Rule 403 to
evidence offered under Rules 413 and 414. In United States v. Sumner,20 the
Eighth Circuit reviewed the conviction of Stuart Lee Sumner for sexually
abusing his live-in girlfriend's minor daughter. Sumner argued on appeal that
the district court erred in admitting evidence that on two prior occasions he had
assaulted fourteen-year-old girls, one occasion which involved uncharged
conduct and another for which Sumner was convicted. The government
responded that Sumner's conviction should be affirmed because the evidence
was admissible under both Rule 404(b)-because it was relevant to Sumner's
"intent"---and under Rule 414. The Eighth Circuit rejected the government's
argument that the evidence of prior bad acts was admissible under Rule 404(b),
because under Eighth Circuit precedent, intent is not at issue in a criminal case
when the defendant denies only the criminal behavior, rather than the criminal
intent.2' The court also rejected the government's argument that the evidence
was admissible under Rule 414, the rule which allows propensity evidence in
to prove a child molestation charge, because the district court had not
performed a Rule 403 analysis to see if the evidence of the two previous
incidents of sexual misconduct was unduly prejudicial. Citing both the
legislative history and the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Larson,
the Eighth Circuit held that the 403 balancing test can limit evidence which
18. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
19. See id. at 604-05.
20. 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997).
21. See id. at 660. -See also United States v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318, 1321-22 (8th Cir.
1995).
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would otherwise come in the case under Rules 413 or 414. Accordingly, the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial.22
In another recent Eighth Circuit case, United States v. LeCompte,3 the
court of appeals reversed a holding by the district judge under Rule 403 that
evidence of a previous incident of child molestation was inadmissable. Leo
LeCompte was charged with sexual abuse of his wife's eleven-year-old niece,
"T.T.," in violation of federal law. The government sought to introduce
evidence under Rule 414 that eight to ten years previously, LeCompte had
sexually abused "C.D.," the niece of LeCompte's previous wife. Citing Rule
403, the district court in South Dakota refused to admit this bad character
evidence. The district judge focused on some differences in the alleged
episodes of sexual abuse of the girls: LeCompte had allegedly played games
with T.T. before molesting her, but had not played games with C.D.; he had
purportedly molested C.D. while her siblings were present but had molested
T.T. in isolation; and the two alleged offenses occurred several years apart.
The District Court also noted that this character evidence would be extremely
prejudicial to LeCompte's case given the fact that "sexual abuse deservedly
carries a unique stigma in our society ....
On appeal, "[i]n light of the strong legislative judgment that evidence of
prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be admissible," the Eighth Circuit
reversed. The appellate court found the differences in the alleged sexual abuse
of C.D. and T.T. (i.e., game-playing, presence of siblings) to be minimal, while
the similarities (the victims were both nieces of LeCompte's wives, LeCompte
had exposed himself to both of them) were great. The lapse of time between
the incidents did not trouble the Court, because LeCompte was in prison for
most of the time between the alleged incidents and could not have molested
children. Finally, the Court was not concerned that the prejudice in this case
was too high, because "[t]his danger is one that all propensity evidence...
presents."5 LeCompte apparently stands for the proposition that under Federal
Rules 413 and 414, character evidence will usually come into a case in which
a criminal defendant is charged with a sex crime, and that the prejudice to the
defendant must be strong to keep such evidence out under Rule 403.
IV. ARE THE NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Shortly after Congress approved the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, commentators began questioning the constitutional
validity of Rules 413, 414, and 41 5.26 The most persuasive arguments were
22. See Sumner, 119 F.3d at 662.
23. 131 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 1997).
24. See id. at 769.
25. See id. at 770.
26. For an argument that Rules 413 and 414 violate a criminal defendant's due process
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based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
and the common-law tradition of refusing to allow propensity evidence in a
trial to prove criminal liability.27 Historically, courts in the United States have
excluded evidence of bad character to prove that the defendant acted in
conformity with that character, not because such evidence is not relevant, but
because it is too relevant. Bad character evidence tends to obscure other
evidence in the trial and influence the jury to convict the defendant not for
committing the crime with which he is charged, but for being a bad person.28
The United States Supreme Court has written that "[t]he overriding policy of
excluding [character] evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the
practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of the
issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice."" The historical aversion to
character evidence by American courts, and the guarantee of "fundamental
fairness" in the criminal justice system by the due process clauses,3" have
encouraged academics and criminal defense lawyers to argue that the new
federal rules allowing character evidence in cases involving sexual assault and
child molestation are unconstitutional.3'
Federal courts have rejected the argument that Rules 413 and 414 violate
criminal defendants' due process rights. In United States v. Enjady,32 the Tenth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Rule 413, with one notable qualification:
that the new rule be subject to the safeguards of Rule 403. Kerry Neil Enjady
was charged with raping a woman, referred to by the court as "A," while she
was unconscious. The government sought to introduce evidence that Enjady
had raped "B," another woman, two years earlier. The district court in New
Mexico admitted the evidence, and Enjady was convicted. On appeal, he
argued that Rule 413 violates fundamental fairness for three reasons: it prevents
a fair trial because of the history of refusing to admit bad character evidence in
rights, see Sheft, supra note 7, at 77-82.
27. The argument has also been made that Rules 413 and 414 violate the equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The gist of this argument is that Rules
413 and 414 deny a particular class of defendants (rape and child molestation defendants) the
right to a fair trail, and that therefore courts must examine the new evidentiary rules with "strict
scrutiny." See Sheft, supra note 7, at 82-86. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have rejected this
argument See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, No.
98-5121, 1998 WL 396582 (Oct. 5, 1998); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir.
1998).
28. See IA JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (1983).
29. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
30. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
31. In 1967, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that decisions from state and federal courts
"suggest that evidence of prior crimes introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal
disposition would violate the Due Process Clause." Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 573-74
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
32. 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
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criminal trials; it creates a presumption of guilt which undermines the
requirement that the defendant be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
and it allows a jury to punish a defendant for past misconduct, "eroding the
presumption of innocence that is fundamental in criminal trials. 33
The Tenth Circuit held that the Rule 403 balancing test could prevent the
defendant from being unfairly prejudiced from propensity evidence introduced
by the government. The court first held that Rule 413 is subject to the
balancing requirements of Rule 403.-4 Next, the court laid out specific
considerations a district court should consider when using the Rule 403
balancing test in the context of sexual assault cases:
1) how clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the
evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how seriously
disputed the material fact is; and 4) whether the government can avail itself
of any less prejudicial evidence. When analyzing the probative dangers,
a court considers: 1) how likely is it such evidence will contribute to an
improperly-based jury verdict; 2) the extent to which such evidence will
distract the jury from the central issues of the trial; and 3) how time
consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct.35
If the district court engages in this sort of careful balancing test, the court in
Enjady was satisfied that unfairness to the defendant could be avoided. An
interesting caveat to the court's holding, however, is the language in the
opinion reading, "[W]ithout the safeguards embodied in Rule 403, we would
hold [Rule 413] unconstitutional. 36 Thus, combining a strict textual reading
of Rule 413 (which apparently does not permit Rule 403 to keep evidence of
previous sexual assaults out of evidence) and the reasoning of the Enjady court
(which requires Rule 403 balancing to hold Rule 413 constitutional), a future
court could conceivably hold that Rule 413, as written, is unconstitutional.
The Eighth Circuit has also held that Rules 413 and 414 are constitutional.
In United States v. Mound,37 Alvin Ralph Mound was convicted in federal
court in South Dakota of sexually abusing his young daughter from 1993 to
January 1997. The district judge admitted evidence under Rule 413 that
Mound had sexually abused a twelve-year-old girl and a sixteen-year-old girl
in 1987.3s On appeal, Mound challenged the constitutionality of Rule 413,
33. Id. at 1432.
34. See id. at 1431. The Tenth Circuit had already held that Rule 414 is subject to Rule
403 balancing. See United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997).
35. See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (citing Sheft, supra note 7, at 59 n.16).
36. Id. at 1433.
37. 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998).
38. In Mound, although the government introduced evidence of prior child molestation
under Rule 413, the Eighth Circuit stated explicitly that its holding applies to both Rule 413 and
to Rule 414. See id. at 800.
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arguing that it violated his due process rights.39 The Eighth Circuit, citing the
Tenth Circuit's Enjady opinion, rejected the argument, holding that "it was
within Congress's power to create exceptions to the longstanding practice of
excluding prior-bad-acts evidence." 4 The Mound opinion seems somewhat
broader than Enjady, because the court in Mound did not expressly condition
the constitutionality of the new federal rules on the application of Rule 403.
The court in Mound focused primarily on the power of Congress to amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than the protections provided sex-crime
defendants by Rule 403.
V. CONCLUSION
Because most sex crimes are prosecuted in state court, the new Federal
Rules of Evidence allowing character evidence into sex-crime cases will
probably have a limited impact on practicing criminal lawyers in Arkansas.
However, several states are apparently following the lead of Congress and
enacting their own versions of Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415.4' If the
Arkansas Supreme Court chooses to adopt rules which allow a prosecutor to
introduce evidence of a defendant's bad character in order to prove that the
defendant committed a crime, it should be prepared to address the same
evidentiary and constitutional issues that have surfaced in the federal courts in
recent years.
39. Mound also argued that Rule 413 denied him equal protection. The court, applying
a "rational relation" standard of review, rejected this argument. Id. at 800-01.
40. Id. at 801.
41. See John Gibeaut, An Evidentiary Dragnet, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 44-45.
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